History of Beate Uhse (1999): founders, timeline, facts

A German company that sold adult products through catalogs and in stores, and from 1999 was publicly listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. By 2005 its revenue had grown to EUR 285 million, after which all of its channels shrank by almost half. In 2017 the holding company filed for insolvency, a fund bought the business in 2018, but in 2019 the new owner turned out to be insolvent as well, and the online business was bought by an outside group.

In brief

Beate Uhse was a German retail and mail-order business selling adult products. On 1999-05-27 it went public on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, and the offering at EUR 7.20 brought in about EUR 63.3 million. Revenue grew from EUR 116.4 million (1999) to a peak of EUR 284.8 million (2005), then fell to EUR 103.0 million (2016, per a press retelling estimate), and on 2017-12-15 the holding company filed for insolvency proceedings in self-administration. The annual reports with multi-year summaries for 1999–2011 and the issuer's releases up to 2015 give the segments year by year, and the main conclusion they lead to is an uncomfortable one: all channels fell at once, not only the retail business that the internet supposedly killed.

How it started (the founders)

The company bears the name of its founder. According to the company's own timeline in the 2007 annual report, the founder launched the mail-order business in 1946, opened what the company calls the world's first sex shop in 1962 (the company's self-description, not verified), and in 1999 the company became a stock corporation; the founder died in 2001. Mail order remained the oldest and largest division: a catalog of 150+ pages came out twice a year in five languages under the brands Beate Uhse, Pabo (the Netherlands), and Adam & Eve.

The legal form and the owners before 1999 have not been disclosed, and the IPO prospectus has not been found unverified. The version that the company was founded in 1951 in Hamburg diverges from the issuer's reports (1946, Flensburg) and is treated as a rumor.

By 2007 the group consisted of four segments: Retail (stores), Mail Order (catalog and online), Wholesale (including Scala), and Entertainment (online services, telephony, TV).

Year-by-year timeline

1946: the founder launches the mail-order business fact
1999: IPO on 1999-05-27 at EUR 7.20 (the top of the range) on the official market in Frankfurt; proceeds of about EUR 63.3 million; first-day close of EUR 13.50; the 1999 high was EUR 28.20; oversubscribed 40× according to the press on the day of the offering (64× in later retellings) estimate
1999–2005: revenue ×2.4 (EUR 116.4 → 284.8 million), staff 722 → 1,523 people; in 2001 revenue is up 36% (EUR 222.8 million), while EBIT falls to EUR 10.6 million fact
2005: the peak: revenue of EUR 284.8 million, EBIT of EUR 22.7 million, net profit of EUR 14.4 million; the share price at year-end is EUR 6.10 versus 19.00 at the end of 1999 fact
2006–2007: revenue of 270.9 → 268.0 million; in 2007 the first operating loss (EBIT of −4.4) and a net loss of EUR 13.2 million; market capitalization of EUR 85.6 million versus 803.9 in 1999 fact
2008–2009: revenue of 252.9 → 230.7 million; EBT of +3.1 and −0.1; the number of shares outstanding grows from 47.0 to 78.1 million fact
2010: revenue of EUR 197.7 million, EBIT of −59.0 million (including 36.5 million in depreciation and impairment), a net loss of EUR 67.6 million; the online part of Mail Order is set up as a separate organizational unit fact
2011: revenue of EUR 149.0 million; the group is refinanced in April–June; 22 company-owned stores are closed; assets are sold to the related shareholder Consipio fact
2012: on 2012-03-07, an application to move the listing from the Prime Standard to the General Standard (the stock stays on the regulated market); revenue of EUR 144.3 million, EBIT of +1.4 million; 10 stores closed fact
2013–2014: revenue of 142.0 → 142.9 million, EBIT of 3.4 → 5.0 million, EBT of +1.3 and +2.4 million (EBT for 2012 is not in the releases we read); a EUR 30 million bond due 2019; the 7.75% coupon and the 2014-07-09 issue date: estimate
2015–2016: 2015: revenue of EUR 128.8 million, EBIT of −13.3 million, including 14.1 million in write-offs and one-off expenses; 2016: revenue of 103.0 million, EBIT of −6.2 million; the last catalog was printed in February 2016 estimate
2017-12-15: the holding company files for self-administration proceedings; only the holding company is affected, and the subsidiaries keep operating fact
2018: on 2018-03-05 the self-administration proceedings are opened (2018-03-02 in one summary); the plan takes effect on 2018-06-18 estimate; on 2018-07-11 the restructuring is completed: the fund Robus Capital receives the business through the plan and a purchase of the Dutch division's assets fact
2019: Orion buys ten stores (announcement of 2019-02-18); in July 2019 the group's new parent entity becomes insolvent; the EDC Retail agreement on the online business is dated 2019-07-10 estimate

Lesser-known but significant facts

In 2006–2011 all four segments fell almost equally. Retail 86.4 → 47.5 (−45%), Mail Order 113.8 → 62.8 (−45%), Wholesale 54.7 → 29.5 (−46%), Entertainment 16.0 → 9.2 (−42%).
Online within the mail-order segment did not grow in money terms. The online share of Mail Order was 42% (2009), 49% (2010), and 67.2% (2011); in euros that is about EUR 43.7 → 43.6 → 42.2 million, while the paper part accounted for 60.4 → 45.4 → 20.6 million [calculated from the shares, rounded; the 2009–2010 share is by orders].
The main shareholder bought assets in the sell-off. In 2011 Consipio (27.2% of the shares) bought 80% of the Norwegian chain Kondomeriet for EUR 3.0 million with a buyback right (2013–2017), and its subsidiary Bocca bought the Dutch company Sandereijn for EUR 0.9 million with an obligation to source 80% of its goods from the group.
The 2010 loss was largely a paper loss. EBIT of −59.0 million against depreciation and impairment of EUR 36.5 million (2011: 8.5 million), of which 27.1 million were one-off and restructuring effects.
The 2015 forecast was missed. The 2015-03-31 release promised EBIT of EUR 2–5 million; the first half came in at −2.7 and the full year at −13.3; excluding the 14.1 million in one-off write-offs, it would have been about +0.8, which is also below the forecast estimate.

Legend vs. the record

Legend: the internet killed retail. The record: the stores (Retail) lost 45% of their revenue in 2006–2011, but the catalog (−45%) and wholesale (−46%) fell just as much; online within Mail Order held at around EUR 42–44 million in 2009–2011, and its share grew only because the paper part collapsed. Closing loss-making locations brought Retail into the black only briefly: in the first half of 2014 the segment's EBIT was EUR 0.8 million, and a year later it was −0.8 million. In 2017 management named causes inside the company: online had been developed hesitantly and unsystematically, the channels operated out of sync, and product policy had been haphazard and reactive. Verdict: in its simple form the legend is wrong. The internet changed demand, but the company failed to grow its online revenue; the problem was the inertia of its assets and its management, not just a change of channel estimate.
Legend: the bankruptcy came out of nowhere. The record: the first operating loss came in 2007; financial covenants were breached in December 2006 and June 2007, with loans of EUR 10 and 15 million terminated; the 2010 loss was an EBIT of −59.0 million; then came the 2011 refinancing, the 2012 move of the listing to the General Standard, a EUR 30 million bond in 2014 (coupon of 7.75% estimate), and missed forecasts in 2015 and 2016. The final push was the failed restructuring of the bond; the dates of the restructuring announcement and of the vote have not been obtained unverified. Verdict: the 2017-12-15 filing came as a surprise to the market, but the process did not: the deterioration went on for about ten years estimate.
Legend: the brand died along with the company. The record: in 2014 the brand was valued at EUR 33.4 million (a Semion study); under the insolvency plan the business passed to be you GmbH (Robus Capital), ten stores went to Orion, and in 2019, when be you GmbH itself became insolvent, the online business was bought by EDC Retail; in 2019 the Beate Uhse brand accounted for about EUR 5 million of the owning group's revenue. Verdict: the brand survived even the second bankruptcy as an online label inside an outside group; over 2014–2019 the brand's revenue did not live up to the valuation, but it did not disappear either estimate.

The first growth lever

The lever of the first period was public capital and scale: after the 1999 IPO (about EUR 63.3 million according to the press on the day of the offering), revenue grew 2.4 times in six years and staff doubled. The growth did not come free: in 2001 revenue grew 36% (EUR 163.5 → 222.8 million), while EBIT fell from EUR 13.9 to 10.6 million, so the margin went from 8.5% to 4.8% [calculation]. Which acquisitions and channels drove the growth of 1999–2005 is not stated in the documents we read unverified.

The paired story

The pair: Private Media Group (history-private-media-group). The lines below have been checked against the pair's dossier.

Two models of being public. Private: an American shell listed on Nasdaq from 1999-02-01, SEC reporting, a controlling owner, trading suspended on 2011-11-15, formal delisting on 2012-01-15. Beate Uhse: a German AG, IPO in Frankfurt on 1999-05-27 (almost four months later); at the end of 2011, a free float of 37.69%, with Consipio at 27.17%.
Scale. Private's revenue in 2002 was EUR 39.4 million, Beate Uhse's 244.5 million (6.2 times more) [calculation]. Both peaked in the 2000s, and both had lost revenue by the 2010s.
Shared money. In November and December 2002 Beate Uhse lent Private $2.0 and $3.0 million at 5%; the $3.0 million loan had been repaid by the end of 2005.
A shared participant: Consipio. According to Private's 10-K, Consipio Holding BV was the holder of a $4.0 million note and a party affiliated with Beate Uhse (that is Private's wording). According to Beate Uhse's reports, Consipio was a shareholder with 27.2% (2010) and 27.17% (2011-12-31) that bought its assets in 2011.
Contrasting fates. Private: a purchase of digital assets in 2009 → losses → an administrator → delisting. Beate Uhse: an asset sell-off in 2011 → the listing moved → an attempt at e-commerce and a bond → the 2017 filing. Private: trading suspended on 2011-11-15. Beate Uhse: the holding company's filing on 2017-12-15, the transfer of the business on 2018-07-11, and the second bankruptcy of the new owner in 2019.
For the episode. Two public issuers with verifiable reports, and a shared participant, Consipio, in both stories in 2010–2011. One more link within the season: under the 2004 reorganization plan of General Media (Penthouse), Beate Uhse AG received 8% of the new equity.

Parallels today (projects from the catalog)

IntentPost (intentpost) is a physical-mail service for B2B sellers: paper mail returns as a pattern interrupt where email is overloaded. The channel that Beate Uhse shut down (the last catalog came out in February 2016) works again in a different form; the difference is a mass print run versus a triggered send based on a signal. view this project's dossier →
Tapgrix (tapgrix) is a dropshipping Shopify store with no warehouse and no locations of its own. It is the opposite pole of asset inertia: Beate Uhse carried stores and catalog logistics, Tapgrix carries nothing, at the price of depending on suppliers and advertising. view this project's dossier →

What a builder can take from this in 2026

Measure channels in absolute money, not in shares. At Beate Uhse, online grew from 42% to 67%, while the money stood still (around EUR 42–44 million). Before you tell the story of a move to online, build a table of revenue and margin by channel.
Closing loss-making locations does not save a channel by itself. The closures of 22 (2011), 10 (2012), and 16–21 (2015) stores went hand in hand with Retail revenue falling from EUR 57.2 million (2010) to 44.3 million (2014); the segment's profit in the first half of 2014 (EBIT of EUR 0.8 million) turned into a loss a year later. For SaaS: loss-making plans and channels get cut on unit economics, but together with a plan for where growth will come from.
Do not promise numbers you cannot see in a quarterly breakdown. The EBIT forecast for 2015 was +2 to +5 million; the actual result was −13.3 million. Keep the forecast narrow and revise it against each quarter's actuals.
Debt on a shrinking business is a countdown. A EUR 30 million bond at 7.75% means about EUR 2.3 million in interest a year [calculated; the coupon is an estimate] against 2014 EBIT of 5.0 million; three years later the debt became the reason for the filing. Do not take on a fixed coupon against a channel that is itself contracting.
A brand valuation is not brand revenue. A EUR 33.4 million valuation in 2014 versus about EUR 5 million in revenue under the new owners in 2019 estimate. Before buying, look at the customer base, the domain, and the logistics.
Watch related-party deals in a restructuring. The buyer of the assets in 2011 was a shareholder with 27% and a participant in someone else's dispute. Check who stands on both sides of the deal.

Discrepancies and what we could not verify

The oversubscription and the market segment of the 1999 IPO. The press on the day of the offering: 40× and the official market; a 2019 blog: 64× and the Neuer Markt, with a high of 28.80 (the issuer's report: 28.20). There is no prospectus; the oversubscription figure is an estimate.
The 2012–2016 annual reports were not read in the primary source; the figures come from press releases and the press, and the segment EBIT for 2012 was not used estimate.
Revenue for 2016 and 2017. 2016 comes from a single retelling; 2017 (almost EUR 100 million) is the buyer's own description estimate.
The chronology of the proceedings. Filing on 2017-12-15, opening on 2018-03-05 (2018-03-02 in one summary), the plan taking effect on 2018-06-18, completion on 2018-07-11; the creditor recovery rate, the dates of the bond restructuring and of the vote, and the price of the 2018 deal have not been found unverified.
The new owner's holding company. The EDC release names Pabo 4.0 as the parent entity, the press names be you GmbH; how the two relate has not been disclosed estimate.
The reasons for the drop in equity in 2000 (EUR 105.6 → 63.9 million) and for the increase in the number of shares in 2008 (47.0 → 70.7 million) are not explained in the reports unverified.
Growth in 1999–2005. Which acquisitions and channels produced the ×2.4 is not documented unverified.
Figures in the reports and the press. Retail 2011: the report text gives EUR 46.2 million (−19.2%), the table 47.5 million (−17.0%); stores closed in 2015: 16 or 21; stores at the end of 2017: 67, versus 81 in the 2016 forecast (figures as of different dates) estimate.
Sources unavailable. The issuer's site beate-uhse.ag does not open; the ad-hoc announcement on the opening of the proceedings and the 2015 report were not obtained in the primary source.

Sources (primary first)

Secondary: Tagesspiegel 1999-05-27, Anleihen-Finder 2016, Anleihen-Finder 2018, neuhandeln 2018, neuhandeln 2019, Börsen-Zeitung, neuhandeln 2016, neuhandeln 2017, SH-Investor 2019, SH-Investor 2019-02
Pointer: Wikipedia — Beate Uhse (Unternehmen)) (no facts are taken from it)

Adults only

Beate Uhse