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Before the Web · Era 1 · Boards, networks and online services

1976–2000acquired by 3Com for $6.6B · 1997

U.S. Robotics

A Chicago company that did for modems what Formula 1 did for ordinary cars: its own HST protocol, which the sysops of electronic bulletin boards bought for speed rather than for compatibility. It won on speed but not on the standard, and in 1997 it sold itself to the networking giant 3Com at the very peak of the modem era, a few years before broadband internet displaced dial-up.

Founders Casey Cowell · Stephen Muka · Paul Collard · Stan Metcalfe · Tom Rossen
Domains
hardwaremodemsbbsprotocol-waracquired-at-peak

In brief

U.S. Robotics is a modem company from Chicago, founded in 1976 by five acquaintances from their student days who each chipped in $200 for an acoustic coupler. The company grew into one of the largest players in the North American modem market not through openness, as its competitor Hayes did, but through the opposite: a closed but fast protocol, HST, sold first and foremost to a professional audience, the sysops of electronic bulletin boards. Its own microchip instead of other companies' chips gave it a real speed advantage, and the same engineering groundwork, brought down in price, produced the budget Sportster and made USR the dominant brand in the mass market. In 1997, at the peak of the modem era, the company was bought by the networking giant 3Com (the deal was announced at $6.6 billion, and on the closing date it was worth $8.5 billion), but only three years later 3Com itself took the asset apart, spinning off Palm and the remainder of the U.S. Robotics business into separate companies, without ever taking a place in the broadband internet market that made dial-up modems unnecessary.

How it started (the founders)

Casey Cowell, a 23-year-old economics graduate of the University of Chicago, dropped out of his doctoral program and returned to Chicago. Together with his classmate Paul Collard and three more acquaintances (according to one summary, Steve Muka, Stan Metcalfe, and Tom Rossen estimate), they each put in $200 and, according to the same summary, rented a windowless room above an army surplus store on Lincoln Avenue in Chicago. The company's name refers not to their own specialty but to a favorite book: "U.S. Robots and Mechanical Men, Inc." from Isaac Asimov's I, Robot. The first product was an acoustic coupler cast in homemade molds; the first year brought in $50,000 in sales, half of it from reselling other companies' equipment rather than from a product of their own. The company took up modems in the usual sense only in 1979, when FCC decisions allowed equipment from companies other than AT&T to be connected to the telephone network, the same regulatory shift on whose wave the future competitor Hayes had started a year earlier.

Year-by-year timeline

Lesser-known but significant facts

  1. The company's name is a literary reference, not a technical one: the five founders named the firm after the fictional corporation from Asimov's I, Robot, not after anything connected with real robotics, which the company never worked on.
  2. Technically, HST did not get along with other makers' modems: it delivered its full speed of 9,600–16,800 bps only when paired with another HST modem, meaning that both the sysop and the caller had to buy USR specifically to get the benefit, and that explains why USR handed out large discounts to sysops in particular, since they were the end of the line that had to be won over first.
  3. The Sportster was not a separate development but the same chip, only cheaper: the budget line of 1993 used the same DSP architecture as the premium Courier for sysops and corporate customers, so one engineering asset was sold twice at different prices.
  4. Palm was bought for $44 million, and five years later it alone was worth $53 billion at its IPO, roughly 1,200 times the purchase price and more than six times the final value of the entire 3Com–USR deal ($8.5 billion); the most expensive asset came to 3Com as an add-on to the modem business.
  5. Cowell left the post of president exactly one month before talks on selling the company began, in January 1997, while remaining chairman and CEO; the chronology in the legal document does not explain the reason, but the coincidence in timing is noticeable.

Legend vs. the record

The first growth lever

The growth lever for U.S. Robotics was not an open standard (that was the move of its competitor Hayes) but the exact opposite strategy: a closed but genuinely faster protocol, sold first to the most demanding and best-paying part of the market. HST in 1986 gave four times the speed of the standard modems of the time, but it ran at full speed only when paired with another HST modem, a technical limitation that turned into a business tool: for a BBS network to actually speed up, the sysop and his regular callers had to switch to USR collectively, and that is exactly why the company offered sysops aggressive personal discounts, since they were the side of the network that had to be won first for the speed effect to become noticeable to users at all. In this way USR took the position of the brand for the professional core of the market long before it even began competing for the mass buyer. The second move, delayed by seven years, finished the job: in 1993 the same DSP architecture developed for the expensive Courier became the basis of the budget Sportster, not a new development but the same asset sold down-market to the mass market, and that is what made USR the largest modem supplier in North America by the mid-1990s.

The paired story (Hayes + U.S. Robotics)

Hayes and U.S. Robotics grew up on the same wave: the FCC allowed equipment from companies other than AT&T to be connected to the telephone network, and both companies started out with modems for enthusiasts. After that their paths diverged. Hayes won the battle for the interface: its AT commands became the language that every modem understood, including USR's modems. U.S. Robotics won the battle for speed: its own DSP architecture instead of the bought-in chips Hayes relied on, and in 1993 the cheap Sportster brought that advantage to the mass market. The endings differed too: Hayes went through bankruptcy twice, and in 1999 its modem assets went at auction for about $5 million (see the Hayes dossier), while U.S. Robotics sold itself to 3Com in 1997 in a deal announced at $6.6 billion and worth $8.5 billion on the closing date.

Parallels today (projects from the catalog)

What a builder can take from this in 2026

  1. A closed but objectively faster product can be as much of a growth lever as an open standard: just address it first to the audience for whom speed matters more than compatibility, and subsidize that audience's entry in particular.
  2. Do not be afraid to sell the same technology asset twice at different prices: a premium version for professionals and a budget one for the mass market on a single engineering base pay back the development faster than building two separate products.
  3. A good price for selling the company is not the same thing as a successful deal. USR sold at the peak of its share price, but the combined company could not hold its position even three years later, so it is worth asking separately not how much you will be paid now, but what the buyer will do with the asset next.
  4. The most valuable asset in a deal is not necessarily the one the deal was made for. 3Com was buying USR's modem business, not Palm, but it was Palm that turned out to be the asset worth more at its IPO than the entire deal.
  5. A technology victory in one cycle does not protect you from the next. USR won the modem speed race, but neither it nor 3Com built a position in broadband internet, the market that wiped out that very race.

Discrepancies and what we could not verify

Sources (primary first)

Secondary (context, cross-check):

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