In brief
Zappos is an online shoe store that Nick Swinmurn launched in San Francisco in 1999 and Tony Hsieh made famous: free shipping and returns, its own warehouse, and round-the-clock support instead of advertising. Over eight years gross sales grew from $1.6 million (2000) to, according to Hsieh, more than $1 billion (2008) estimate, and in July 2009 Amazon announced that it was buying the company entirely for its own stock. The story is worth telling because at Zappos returns and service were not a cost but a way to keep the customer, and this calculation can be checked against documents. But "culture saved the company" is a simplification: alongside it stood Hsieh's money, bank credit lines, and a venture round.
How it started (the founders)
By 1999 Swinmurn was doing contract work at Silicon Graphics; his earlier jobs and his education are not confirmed by the sources estimate. He explains the idea simply: in stores the selection is limited to what the buyer ordered, while online you can show everything. The first version of the model was to go to stores, photograph the shoes, put them on the site, and buy the pair from the store at full price if someone ordered it. To get started he raised about $150,000 and left his contract at Silicon Graphics.
Investors did not work out: by his account, he went around about ten venture funds, and a lawyer put him in touch with Venture Frogs, the small fund of Tony Hsieh and Alfred Lin (according to Swinmurn, they put in the first $500,000). Before that, Hsieh and Lin had sold their company LinkExchange to Microsoft, in 1998 according to retellings estimate. In 2003 Entrepreneur put the size of the market at $40 billion of shoes a year, about $2 billion of it through catalogs; what exactly convinced Hsieh is not in the sources. The site opened in June 1999 as ShoeSite.com; in July it was renamed Zappos, from the Spanish zapatos (with an extra p, and to stand out more against the competitors that were appearing). Hsieh came into operational management later: only Wikipedia gives 2001, and the exact date is not confirmed estimate.
Year-by-year timeline
- 1999-06: ShoeSite.com launches; starting capital of about $150,000 fact
- 1999-07: renamed Zappos.com, 100+ brands, accounts for returning customers, agreements with manufacturers to ship orders estimate
- 2000: gross sales of $1.6 million fact
- 2001: $8.6 million; Hsieh becomes co-head of the company estimate
- 2002: $32 million fact
- 2003: $70 million (the fall 2003 forecast was $65 million); by the fall the company already holds goods in its own warehouse; dropshipping, which had brought in about 25% of revenue, is dropped estimate
- 2003-06: a $6 million credit line from Wells Fargo fact
- 2004: $184 million, the first venture capital from Sequoia, a move from San Francisco to Henderson, in the Las Vegas area estimate
- 2005: $370 million in gross sales; losses in Q1–Q2 fact
- 2006: Q1–Q2 in the black while aiming for a result of around zero (within 1% of net sales); ~2/3 of sales from repeat customers; 4+ million paying customers; Swinmurn leaves the company fact
- 2007: Hsieh says that marketing brings in about $6 of sales for every $1 and that the money goes into service rather than advertising fact
- 2008: a forecast of more than $1 billion in gross sales (the forecast for 2007 was $800 million); the result of more than $1 billion comes from a retelling of Hsieh's words, and there is no reported figure; according to a retelling, 37% of purchases were returned estimate
- 2009-07-22 / 2009-11-01: the deal with Amazon is signed and closed
Lesser-known but significant facts
- The first version of the model was a middleman store with no warehouse and no contract with manufacturers: photograph shoes in stores and buy the pair at full price after an order.
- For its first five years Zappos did without venture funds, apart from Venture Frogs, Hsieh and Lin's own fund: until Sequoia in 2004, growth ran on that money, bank credit lines, and profit.
- Dropshipping was switched off because the "in stock" promise was not being kept: before the switch, 80–90% of the products shown were in stock, and 10–20% of customers found out a couple of days later that the item was unavailable; giving it up cost ~25% of revenue.
- At first the warehouse was run by a contractor, not by Zappos itself: according to a retelling of Hsieh's book, outsourcing the warehouse near a UPS hub in Kentucky is called a mistake, and the warehouse a core competency that the company should have handled from the very beginning estimate.
- Sequoia partner Michael Moritz recalls that the fund had doubts because of returns and inventory: in his words, a high rate of returns and the huge cost of holding inventory.
Legend vs. the record
- "Amazon bought Zappos for $1.2 billion." That is how the investor's page puts it, and that is how the deal is retold. The record: the 8-K of 2009-07-22 shows the price paid in stock, with cash only for fractional shares; ~10 million shares worth $807 million at an average price of $81.09, plus $40 million for retention in cash and RSUs; 10% of the shares went into escrow. Per Amazon's 10-K, at closing on 2009-11-01: $1,079 million in stock plus $55 million in options = $1,134 million. Verdict: inaccurate; "$1.2 billion" is $1.134 billion on the closing date rounded up, at signing it was about $847 million ($807 million in stock and $40 million for retention), and holders were paid in stock, not cash.
- "Zappos survived thanks to its culture." The legend: good people and service pulled the company through on their own. The record: Hsieh called spending on service a retention investment in place of advertising, and by 2006 about 2/3 of sales came from repeat customers. But alongside that stood the founders' money, credit lines ($6 million in 2003, $60 million + $20 million in 2006), and Sequoia in 2004. Verdict: partly true; culture explains retention, not survival, which was paid for by money and warehouse discipline.
- "From day one Zappos gave 365 days for returns and free shipping." Documents from the era: free expedited shipping and free returns were there from the start, but the return window in early descriptions is 60 days; later retellings place the 365 days at a later time, and the year of the change was not found. Verdict: half true; free returns came early, 365 days later, date unverified.
- "Zappos always kept its own warehouse" and "was always a dropshipper." In 1999 Swinmurn bought the pair from a store after an order; then came 100+ brands shipped by the manufacturers; a warehouse run by a contractor, then its own; dropshipping stopped estimate. By the fall of 2003 the press was already writing about its own warehouse. Verdict: both claims are wrong; the model changed in three stages.
The first growth lever
The lever was not advertising but returns as a product: free shipping both ways, no fee for accepting a return, and returns through UPS with a ready-made label. For shoes, where fit is unpredictable, this removed the main fear of buying online. It came at a high price: according to a retelling, in 2008 37% of purchases, worth $379 million, were returned estimate, and there is no primary source. The company counted this as marketing: $6 of sales for every $1 of marketing, with a marketing team of 9 people out of 1,200 employees in 2007, and about 2/3 of sales from repeat customers in 2006. According to Lin (secondhand), the most profitable customers were the ones who returned the most and bought the most rumor. The second part of the lever was the warehouse: giving up dropshipping in favor of keeping goods in stock cost 25% of revenue, but removed the main way the promise failed.
The paired story
The pair is Boo.com, a London fashion store. Both sold clothing and shoes online from 1999: Zappos launched in June, Boo.com on November 3, in 18 countries at once. The bets were opposite: Zappos started with $150,000 and photos from other people's stores, and raised spending as demand grew; Boo.com planned £20 million, had spent four times as much by launch, and in all took more than £80 million from investors. In 2000 Zappos made $1.6 million in gross sales, while Boo.com took £200,000 in revenue over its last two months; the liquidators from KPMG were called in on May 17, 2000. The commonly cited figure of $135 million over 18 months has no primary source estimate. The documents collected show no shared people or deals between the companies.
Parallels today (projects from the catalog)
- Tapgrix (
tapgrix) is a Shopify store for gaming accessories run on dropshipping (CJ Dropshipping, Printful), with no warehouse, and quickly listed for sale; this is exactly the model Zappos left behind in 2003 because of in-stock failures and the loss of control over the experience. view this project's dossier → - myAskAI (
myaskai) is an AI responder for customer support; Zappos made service its main expense and a retention channel, and today the same questions are handled by automation. view this project's dossier →
What a builder can take from this in 2026
- Count returns as marketing, not as a loss: if your product carries a costly fear of buying (fit, compatibility, size), free returns pay off only when you see repeat purchases; set up a metric for the share of orders from repeat customers (at Zappos ~2/3 by 2006).
- Do not promise "in stock" until you control the inventory: Zappos gave up dropshipping at the cost of 25% of revenue; if you dropship, measure the share of orders that fail because the item is out of stock.
- Start with a cheap version, then build the infrastructure: Swinmurn tested demand with photos and buying after an order, and only then built a warehouse.
- Watch the price in the deal documents: in a stock deal the value floats between signing and closing ($807 million in stock at signing and $1,079 million at closing a little over three months later; the total of $1.134 billion also includes $55 million in options).
- Service will not replace money: the culture worked because credit lines and funding rounds stood behind it.
Discrepancies and what we could not verify
- The Venture Frogs amount: $500,000 per Swinmurn versus $2 million in Wikipedia; not confirmed by a document estimate.
- The Sequoia amount: $20 million versus $35 million cumulative estimate.
- The year dropshipping was dropped: about 2003 (a 2007 interview that puts it four years earlier, and the fall 2003 press describing its own warehouse); the year of the switch to 365 days was not found estimate.
- Swinmurn's biography before 1999 (Autoweb, film) is not confirmed by the sources estimate.
- The 2008 returns (37% / $379 million): only a student blog, no primary source estimate.
- Gross sales are a private company's figures from letters and interviews, not audited revenue.
- Bloomberg 2010, Forbes 2020, and Las Vegas Sun 2009 did not open (403/402); the 1999–2000 Wayback snapshots and the book "Delivering Happiness" were not read.
- Boo.com: $135 million over ~18 months and the bankruptcy on 2000-05-18 come from Wikipedia; the Guardian gives more than £80 million and the liquidators being called in on 2000-05-17, and the BBC reported the bankruptcy on May 18 estimate.
Sources (primary first)
- https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001018724/000119312509154182/d8k.htm — Amazon 8-K, 2009-07-22
- https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/000119312509153130/dex991.htm — Amazon press release, 2009-07-22
- https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001018724/000119312510016098/d10k.htm — Amazon 10-K for 2009
- https://fortune.com/2012/09/05/nick-swinmurn-zappos-silent-founder/ — Swinmurn, 2012
- https://www.entrepreneur.com/business-news/entrepreneur-business-beyond-their-years/65006 — Entrepreneur, 2003-11
- https://venturebeat.com/technology/zapposcom-makes-it-look-easy — VentureBeat, 2005-02-02
- https://sgbonline.com/?p=16111 — Hsieh's letter, 2006-07-26
- https://marketingsherpa.com/article/interview/how-zappos-grew-so-big — Hsieh interview, 2007-08-07
- https://articles.sequoiacap.com/zappos-story — Sequoia
- https://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history2/90/Zappos-com-Inc.html, https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/2020/11/30/why-tony-hsieh-was-an-ecommerce-pioneer/, https://d3.harvard.edu/platform-rctom/submission/zappos-delivering-happiness-powered-by-service/ — secondary
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zappos — only as a pointer